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[Sac. No. 5749. In Bank. Dec. 19, 1947.]

CALIFORNIA MOTOR TRANSPORT CO., LTD. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Appellant.
[1] Automobile Stages - Actions-Evidence-License Tax Based
on Intracity Services.-In an action by a highway carrier to
EtlCOVer taxes assessed against it under the Motor Vehicle
Transportation License Tax Law (Stats. 1933, p. 928, as
amended j Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5130d; now Rev. &
Tax. Code, §§ 9601-10501), the evidence supported a finding
that plaintiff was carrying on two separate businesses, a high-

[1] See 2 Cal.Jur.l0-Yr.Supp. 40; 33 Am.Jur. 330.
?ricK. Dig. References: [1] Aut~mobile Stages, § 16; [2] Automobile Stages, § 2.
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way trucking business between two cities and an intracity pick~
np and delivery business, so as to render its receipts from the
intracity business exempt from taxation under the statute,
where it was apparent that plaintiff kept separate and distinet:~
records of the income from each of the two services, even;\
though such records were not maintained in physically sepa-f,
rate volumes.
[2] Id.-Licenses-Test for Tax Liabllity.-The mere fact that¥
one operator conducts both a highway common carrier busi-;"
ness and a city carrier business does not establish as a matter j',
of law that there is but a single business operation so as to:.
render the carrier's receipts for the'intracity business taxable
under the Motor Vehicle Transportation License Tax Law."
The test for tax liability rests in the character of the operation
and fact of segregation and not in the identity of the operator. {

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac- :
ramento County. Peter J. Shields, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by highway carrier to recover taxes paid under pro-'
test. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Robert W. Kenny, Fred N. Howser, Attorneys General, John
L. Nourse and James E. Sabine, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Appellant.
Norman A. Eisner for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant Board of Equalization appeals,
from a judgment, rendered by the court sitting without a jury,
in favor of plaintiff corporation in its suit to recover payments .
made by it under protest, of sums which had been demanded ~
by defendant as additional taxes and interest thereon due
from plaintiff for the period of October 1, 1940, to December f
31, 1942, under the California Motor Vehicle Transportation
License Tax Law (see Stats. 1933, p. 928, as amended, Stats.
1935, p. 2176; Deering's Gen Laws, 1937, Act 5130d), which i
was amended and transferred in 1941 (effective July 1, 1943) j
to the Revenue IUld Taxation Code (§§ 9601-10501). Inas~
much as the 1941 amendments did not materially alter those j
provisions of the law which are here involved, section numbers
'1
I
hereinafter cited will, unless otherwise specifically indicated,
refer to the Revenue and Taxation Code.
The law provides for the licensing of operators of motor
vehicles who for compensation transport persons or property
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upon any public highway within the state (§ 9701), and imposes upon such operators a license tax at the rate of 3 per
cent of their gross receipts from the operations includl'd
within the law (§ 9651). The tax does not apply to "operators of motor vehicles operated exclusively within incorporated cities . . . [nor] to the gross receipts derived from the
transportation of ... property wholly within incorporated
cities . . . where no portion of the public highway outside the
corporate limits of the cities • . . is traversed in such opera.
tion." (§ 9653.) For the reasons hereinafter stated, we have
concluded that the trial eourt must be sustained in its determination that the taxes and interest here sought to be retained
by defendant board were assessed and collected by it upon
receipts which are exempt under the provisions of the section
last above cited and that plaintiff is entitled to the refund
decreed.
[1] The record discloses that plaintiff is a highway common carrier IllS defined in sections 2%, and 50%, of the Public
Utilities Act of California (Stats. 1915, p. 115; 2 Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 6386), and as such, operates under certificates
of public convenience and necessity which restrict plaintiff's
common carrier operations to the transportation of exprl'SS
matter of California Motor Express, Limited, a corporation
(hereinafter referred to as the express company), between the
latter's terminal depot located at Los Angeles and its terminal
depots in San Francisco and Oakland, and which prohibit
plaintiff from operating any pickup and delivery service in
any of the three cities as part of its intercity operations.
Plaintiff concedes that its gross receipts from the intercity
operations, as distinguished from pickup and delivery service,
are subject to the license tax, and no part of such receipts is
here involved.
Prior to May 1, 1941, pickup and delivery service in the city
of Los Angeles had been rendered to the express company by
one James C. Coughlin, an individual, with equipment owned
by him; and in Oakland and San Francisco, it had been
rendered by Redline Transfer Company, a copartnership
(hereinafter referred to as Redline), with equipment which
the latter owned. On or about May 1, 1941, plaintiff purchased from Coughlin and Redline, respectively, the equipment with which they had rendered the Los Angeles and
Oakland pickup and delivery services, and thereupon undl'r
a permit issued to plaintiff on April 7, 1941, by the Railroad
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Commission (now th(' Public Utilities Commission) of Cali."
fornia to operate as a city carrier (Stats. 1935, ch. 312), plaintiff undertook with its newly acquired equipment to furnish
for the express company the same pickup and delivery service
in Los Angeles and Oakland which Coughlin and Redline had
theretofore performed. Redline continued to render that
service in San Francisco. The taxes which defendant now
seeks to uphold were assessed upon the receipts from pickup
and delivery services rendered by plaintiff in Los Angeles and
Oakland, and also upon a 20 per cent portion of the receipts
of Redline's San Francisco service which defendant claimed
was attributable to plaintiff because of occasional use by Red- .
line, without payment therefor to plaintiff, of certain of plaintiff's equipment. However, defendant now agrees in its
brief that plaintiff was entitled to judgment ordering refund
of the amount paid as taxes measured by Redline receipts, and
confines itself to arguing the point that "the judgment should
be reversed to the extent that it gives respondent [plaintiff1
a refund of taxes on the receipts from its Los Angeles and
Oakland pickup and delivery business. "
It is conceded that neither Coughlin nor Redline had ever
paid or been required to pay taxes under the law here involved upon their receipts from any of the described pickup
and delivery services. Plaintiff rendered the services under
written contracts with the express company which covered
only the pickup and delivery work and which were separate
from the written contracts between plaintiff and the express
company covering the intercity and interterminal services.
Plaintiff's evidence is to the further effect, and the trial court
found, that plaintiff as "a city carrier . . . had separate
equipment, lighter and different than that which it employed
in its capacity of highway carrier. That the vehicles used by
plaintiff in said pickup and delivery service have not been
and are not used in highway transportation, and have not
and do not operate outside the corporate limits of Los Angeles
or Oakland. It confined its business as a city carrier strictly
within the limits for which it was licensed, and intruded in no
particular within the field of the highway carrier. It . . .
rendered separate and independent bills to California Motor
Express, Ltd., for said city carrier services. The plaintiff as
a highway common carrier did likewise. Its equipment never
deviated from its devotion to the service for which it was licensed. It kept accounts restricted to its character as a high-
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way carrier. . . . That plaintiff is both a highway carrier and
a city carrier and it exists in each of these characters by
separate authority. Each business [of plaintiff] has a separate license or certificate. . . . The businesses were not confused or entangled and did not overlap. The Court finds that
the two operations, that of a city carrier and that of a highway carrier, are just as separate and distinct for all purposes
of this case as if the two operations had been conducted by
separate and distinct corporations or legal entities." The
court further found that "plaintiff has at all times kept separate and distinct books and records covering said pickup and
delivery service and entirely independent of books and records
covering its intercity operations. "
In support of its position that the assessments upon the
receipts of pickup and delivery service performed by plaintiff were lawfully made, defendant relies in particular upon
the case of Bekins Van Lines, Inc., v. Johnson (1942), 21
Ca1.2d 135 [130 P.2d 421]. The situation in that case, however, does not coincide with that now before us. There it was
not proven and found by the court, as here, that the plaintiff
conducted two separate and distinct business operations, each
of which performed distinct and different services under contracts separately executed with the recipient of the services.
Rather, the plaintiff there argued that before the tax rate was
applied, it was entitled to deduct from its gross receipts for
the hauling of goods from its customers' dwellings in one city
to those in other cities an amount computed as attributable
to services rendered in loading and unloading such goods between house and sidewalk, as well as amounts "separately
indicated on its waybills received from pick-Up and delivery
service within municipalities." In its opinion this court continued (p. 139 of 21 Cal.2d), "In intercity hauls of small consignments the plaintiff found it more convenient to pick up /'
and deliver with the use of smaller trucks between the point
of pick-Up or delivery and the larger truck or van which was
to transport or which had transported the goods over the'
public highways. In other intercity hauls, the van or truck
received and discharged the load directly at the door. The
plaintiff contends that receipts from such separate pick-up
and delivery service within municipalities in connection with
intercity hauls should be excepted from assessment under the
act because that service is conducted entirely within municipalities and does not employ any part of the public highways.' I
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The trial court rendered judgment against plaintiff in its suit
to recover taxes paid under protest upon the receipts which'';
it claimed should be exempted as described above, and ther~\
after counsel for the respective parties waived findings of fact~'
and conclusions of law. There was no contention that the'.~
evidence was insufficient to support any essential, implied~.
finding. In that state of the record this court presumed, as it.:
was bound to do and as it emphasized, ,. that every fact es-.~.
sential to the support of the judgment was proved and found ;
by the court . . . [and] that the proof showed and that the .?
court found and concluded that the services' out of which the
disputed tax arose were so much a part of the business of,
plaintiff, were so customarily rendered in that connection, and
80 directly contributed to the transportation which was the ;;:
plaintiff's principal business, that money derived therefrom
must be regarded as part of the •gross receipts from opera- ,t
tions of said operator' and taxable as such" (p. 137 of 21 Cal.
2d) and affirmed the judgment.
It is to be noted, also, that the court in its opinion in the
above-cited case points out (p. 142 of 21 Ca1.2d) that" rE'ceipts 1:
from intra-city business as excepted from the act [Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 9653] were not included rby the Board of Equalization] in the computation of gross receipts from operation as
defined by the act. Nor were charges for labor furnished for
the purpose of packing and crating goods, or warehousing,
included in the gross receipts subject to taxation," and that
(p. 138) in its return to the board for the years in question
"the plaintiff reported its gross rf.'ceipts from all transportation business in the state exclusive of hauls excepted by section 14 [now § 9653} of the act," but claimed deductions
therefrom as described above. It thus appears that only receipts from those services which were found to be integral
parts of the single operation of moving goods from a dwelling,
over the public highways, to their destination outside of the
city in which the moving operation originated, were held subject to the tax. By contrast, plaintiff in the instant case is
not moving the goods of its own customers in intercity operations whereof the pickup and delivery service forms an integral part of a unitary operation, but is rather, as found
by the trial court, engaging in two separate and distinct businesses, severally authorized by a certificate of public convenience and necessity and by a permit to operetf.' as a city
carrier, in which it renders to an express company. which
p

)
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alone deals with the general public, separate services under
separate contraets and with separate and independent bills
rendered therefor. Manifestly, the fact that the same goods
were the subjects of both intracity and intercity transportation does not establish that as a matter of law there was but
a single business operation. In truth, the plaintiff in its Cllpacity of highway carrier was, as previously noted, prohibited from rendering pickup and delivery service in any of its
terminal depot cities and, hence, could carry intercity only
the identical goods which were the subject of pickup and
delivery by some other operation or agency.
Defendant attacks as being without support in the evidence
the finding, quoted hereinabove, that "plaintiff has at all times
kept separate and distinct books and records covering said
pick-up and delivery service and entirely independent of books
and records covering its intercity operations." On this point
plaintiff's auditor testified that the revenues from the two
services are "set up separately in the accounts of the Transport Company. In other words, one under revenue derived
from line haul service and the other derived from city carrier
service, " that the revenue accounts were not kept in physically separate books or "even separate pages; just columns
on the page would indicate the line haul and .the other." It
is thus apparent that the evidence indicated that plaintiff kept
separate and distinct records of the income from each of the
two services, even though such records were not maintained
in physically separate volumes, and that the two businesses
were operated as separate enterprises. It is further apparent
that the receipts from one of such enterprises-the pickup
and delivery work which was performed entirely within incorporated cities-is expressly exempted from taxation under
the Motor Vehicle Transportation License Tax Law. This
court has recently reiterated that (Edison California Stores
v. McColgan (1947), 30 Ca1.2d 472, 476 [183 P.2d 16])
"Persons may adopt any lawful means for the lessening of
the burden of taxes which in one form or another may be
laid upon properties or profits. (Pioneer Express Co. v. Riley,
208 Cal. 677, 687 [284 P. 663].) . It was also reiterated in that
case that courts, in interpreting statutes lp.vying taxes, may
not extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear
import of the language used, nor enlarge upon their operation
so as to embrace matters not specifically included. In cas~
of doubt, construction is to favor the taxpayer rather than
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the government. " That plaintifr's segregation of its opera,:;.
tions may contribute to effecting a tax saving furnishes
ground for attack upon it where, as the trial court here found;
"there is no evidence of fraud or bad faith."
.:
[2J Unless we are to hold that as a matter of law o~~
operator who conducts both a highway common carrier business and a city carrier business ca~ot segregate the two op.
eratiom, however separate in fact, for tax purpose, the judg-..
ment of the trial court must be sustained. We are satisfied
that the true test for tax liability in this case rests in the
character of the operation and fact 0'1 segregation and not
in the identity of the operator.
.~
For the reasons above stated the judgment appealed from
is affirmed.

no

Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J. t concurred.

;.

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Under the California Mot~~·
Vehicle Transportation Liceme Tax Law as comtrued by.!
this court, an operator of motor vehicles engaged in inter-.'
city tramportation of goods must include in the taxable gross \
receipts from such tramportation reve~ue derived from ser·,
vices incide~taI to the intercity tramportation. This court·
has held that receipts from a pickup and delivery service
maintained for door-to-door delivery are taxable as part of "
the gross receipts from intercity transportation of the goods....
(Bekins Van Lines, Inc. v. Johnson, 21 CaI.2d 135 [130 P.2d "
421]; Southern California Freigh' Lines v. State Board of .~.
Equalization, 72 CaI.App.2d 26 [163 P.2d 776].) As in .
those cases, the pickup and delivery service in the present
case was maintained by plaintiff for door-to-door delivery
of goods moved between cities, and was as much a part of
the intercity tramportation. The facts found by the trial
court establish no substantial difrerence between the taxpayers' activities in those eases and the activities of plainti1f
in the present case. The holding that even though others .~
must include revenue derived from a pickup and delivery .
service in their taxable gross receipts, plaintiff need not, af· .~
fords plaintifr an unwarranted competitive advantage over i
others engaged in the same activities.
. .~
The California Motor Vehicle Tramportation License Tax .~
Law (now incorporated in the Revenue and Taxation Code \
and hereafter cited according to the section numbers of that

l
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code) provides: "A license tax is hereby imposed upon operators at the rate of 3 per cent of the gross receipts of the
operators from operations." (§ 9651.) The term "operator"
includes" any person engaging in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon any
public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly."
(§ 9603.) "'Gross receipts' include all receipts from the
operation of motor vehicles entirely within this State . . .
'Gross receipts' do not include revenue derived by an express company from the shipment of property over the lines
of common carriers, but do include revenue derived by an
express company from the transportation of the property in
motor vehicles operated by it." (§ 9606.) The statute does
1I0t apply to "operators of motor vehicles operated within
incorporated cities." (§ 9653.) It exempts "the gross receipts
derived from the transportation of persons or property wholly
within incorporated citieR or between incorporated cities and
private property or wholly on private property where no portion of the public highway outside the corporate limits of the
cities is traversed in such operation. " (§ 9653.)
In Bekins Van Lines Inc. v. Johnson, supra, the plaintiff
was engaged in intercity transportation of household goods.
It objected to including in its taxable gross receipts compensation for the moving of goods from one house or the placing
of them into another before and after its transportation over
intercity highways on trucks operated by plaintiff; it also
objected to including in its taxable gross receipts compensation derived from an intracity pickup and delivery service
maintained for the transportation of small consignments to
and from its intercity terminals. In holding such compensation to be part of plainti1f's gross receipts from taxable
operations, this court stated: "The plaintiff concedes that
the words 'operation of motor vehicles' as used in the definition include loading and unloading activities at the sidewalk. However, the goods must be taken to and from the
sidewalk as an inseparably preparatory activity connected
with the loading and unloading operations. We therefore
fail to see how the plaintiff can be excused from the payment of a proportion of the license tax based on its claim
that more than 50 per cent of gross receipts from operations
was derived from time devoted to such preparatory actiyities. The preparatory BCti vities sought to be expected are

'1 c.J4....

226

CAL.

MOTOR ETC. CO. fJ. STA'IE

BD.

OF EQUAL.

just as much part of and essential to' transportation, ~d:
therefore to operation of motor vehicles, as are actual load;'
iug and unloading operations which are also preparatol')'
to the rolling of the vehicle along the highways. To adopt
the plaintiff's suggestion would be to add to the language of
the definition a limitation which the Legislature did nof
express, and which it must be deemed it did not intend. If'
the Legislature intended to exclude from 'operation' as defined every incidental service and activity customary and,
essential in the matter of transporting goods for compe~
tion and hire it could easily have said so. By failure to U8~{
any such limiting words the Legislature indicated its intention of not so limiting or circumscribing the meaning or
scope of the act. (In re Bush, 6 Cal.2d 43 [56 P.2d 511).)~
• . . Nor may any distinction be made by the plaintiff on'
its returns between intercity hauls which require for convenience an intra-city pick-up and delivery service, and those.
which do not require such service in the convenient method
of initiating or terminating such intercity transportation.
• • . No invalidity may be said to attach by reason of the
fact that the plaintiff here is taxed on its intra-city pick-Up
and delivery service in connection with its intercity hauls.
are distinguished from its strictly intra-city business. (In
Bush, supra.)" (21 Cal.2d 135, 140-142; see, also, Southef'1J
Oalifornia Freight Lines v. State Board of Equalization"
supra.)
In the present case plaintiff rendered separate monthly'
bills to the express company for "terminal to terminal line
haul charges" and for "pick-up and delivery services at Los
Angeles and Oakland." Plaintiff's bills for May, 1941, which
are illustrative of plaintiff's dealings with the express company, included as freight hauled from terminal to terminal
"Northbound 5,709,572 lbs." and "Southbound 6,631,411
Ibs." The same amount of "Northbound" or "Southbound"
freight was picked up or delivered by plaintiff in Los Angeles. Accordingly, there is no dispute that the same goods
were moved by plaintiff in its interc.ity. hauli and in its
intracity pickup and delivery service. The latter was the
first or last step of the intercity transportation of the goods
moved by plaintiff for the express company.
None of the facts found by the trial court, on which the
majority opinion relies, affects the decisive fact that plaintiff's intracit1 pickup and delivery service was incidental
'10 tbe moving of the goods between cities. It is immaterial

r.
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that plaintiff used different trucks for transporting goods
within city limits and for hauling them from terminal ';0
terminal. The plaintiff in the Bekins case relied on the use
of separate trucks, but this court held that the use of such
trucks in operating a pickup and delivery service was simply
a convenient method of starting or terminating intercity
transportation. It is also immaterial that for the operation
of its pickup and delivery service plaintiff secured a permit
as a city carrier, and that the certificate of convenience and
necessity under which it moved freight over intercity highways was limited to the carrying of freight from terminal to
terminal. Receipts from activities that are part of intercity
transportation of goods are taxable regardless of whether
any permit is required to engage in such activities. (I'll re
Busk, 6 Cal.2d 43, 51 [56 P .2d 511].) If a special permit is
secured for certain activities, it does not follow that these
activities are disconnected from other activities of the carrier.
The present case cannot be distinguished on the grounds
that plaintiff engaged in transporting goods for the express
company and not for the consignors of the goods, or that it
kept separate accounts of its receipts from transporting goods
between the terminals and its receipts from the intracity
pick-up and delivery service. It is settled that an operator
is taxable on receipts from the transportation of goods
whether he rendered his services to one or several customers
or whether he engaged in his activities as an agent or as an
independent contractor. (I'll re Busk, 6 Ca1.2d 43, 54 [56
P.2d 511].) Separate charges for the pickup and delivery
service were made by the plaintiff in the Bekins case as well
as by plaintiff in the present case. The fact that plaintiff
entered the receipts from the hauling of goods between the
terminals and from its intracity pickup and delivery service in separate accounts does not mean that the two activities were unconnected and that plaintiff operated two unrelated businesses. A carrier like any other business may keep
separate accounts to ascertain the revenue obtained from its
various activities. The tax applies because of the taxpayer's
activities in transporting goods for hire on the public highways of the state, not because it keeps accounts in a certain
way. Plaintiff's pickup and delivery service is as much an
integral part of its intercity transportation of goods as such
service was in the Bekins and Freight Lines cases, ,upra, and
is not made less so by mere bookkeeping entrie41.
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The present case is clearly distinguishable from Pione~r
Express 00. v. Riley, 208 Cal. 677 [284 P. 663]. In that case'
different corporations were engaged in making intercitY:
hauls and operating an intracity pickup and delivery ser:~
vice. It was contended that there was unity of control
to the two corporations, but this court declined to go behind"
the corporate entities. In the present case the same corpo:.::
ration is engaged in hauling the goods between terminals'
and in the intracity pick-up and delivery service.
'j
The decision of this case depends solely upon whether'
plaintiff's pickup and delivery service was part of its in:'
tercity transportation service. In my opinion it was, whether:
or not it may be regarded as a separate business. The ma..:
jority opinion, however, regards as controlling the question"
whether the taxpayer has so segregated its activities that'
the pickup and delivery service may be regarded as a se~ ,
arate business. Even if such a segregation were the test of;
taxability under the statute, the question whether the ser':
vice is operated as a separate business would not present an 1
issue for the final determination of the trial court. The E
problem would involve questions of both law and fact. What
a taxpayer's activities are is a question of fact; whether,
such activities give rise to tax liability is a question of law:,
depending on what the statute means and how it applies to '.
the facts. (Estate of Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453, 456 [159 P.2d '
630]; Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. Oalifornia Employment Oom."
17 Cal.2d 321, 326 [109 P.2d 935]; Oounty of Sierra v.~'
Oounty of Nevada, 155 Cal. 1, 14 [99 P. a71}; Signal Hill "
v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 196 Cal. 161, 168 [236 P. 304] ; \
Mitchel v. Brown, 43 Cal.App.2d 217, 222 [110 P.2d 456];
see 23 Cal.Jur. 719; 10 Cal.Jur. 882.)
,
In this case the purposes of plaintiff in operating the pick- "
up and delivery service, the conditions under which the '
service was operated, and its relation to the intercity trans- .
portation, are either undisputed or ascertainable from the':
findings. Even under the separate business test of the majority opinion, the taxability of the receipts from the ser-'
vice in question should be determined as a matter of law,
and this court should hold such receipts taxable on the
ground that there is no essential distinction behveen this case
and t,hp. Bekins and Freight Lines cases where the operators
maintained pick-up and delivery service for the same purposes, under essentially the same conditions, and in the same
relation to their intercity transportation..

as:
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If trial courts can reach different decisions under such
circumstances, and such decisions are to be final, some taxpayers may be subject to taxation but others engaged in
essentially the same activities may not. The majority opinion, by leaving it to the trial courts to make final determinations whether the statute applies to given facts gives some
taxpayers a competitive advantage over others, thus defeating the uniform operation of the statute throughout the state.

Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
15,1948. Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., voted for
a rehearing.
.
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